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Introduction
Contemporary global politics demonstrates that all attempts to incorporate certain global trends into existing "drawers" of different theoretical directions can hardly offer comprehensive explanations. The gap between different approaches can be seen in the example of the current Ukrainian crisis and the harmonization of foreign policy of the Western Balkan countries with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU). The institutional approach, for example, has convincingly explained the formation of the European Union and its nearly seven decades long evolution showing that institutions and specific policy processes may be adequate frameworks for the positioning of this organization on a continental and global scale (Peters 2007: 223) . The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy has been built for more than two decades and it has become an articulate voice of the Member States towards third countries (Baker 2011: 343-358) . However, if one examines its effectiveness in solving crises in the EU's neighbourhood, in particular in the case of the recent Ukrainian crisis, one can conclude that it has not been too effective, and that sanctions against the Russian Federation have not yielded the desired results related to stabilization.
The Ukrainian crisis also shows that realism has not lost its historical battle with other theories of international relations (liberalism, constructivism, critical approach, etc.) , as was often emphasized in the post-Cold War period (Waltz 1979 / Novičić 2007 . This theoretical approach points to the newly induced security threats and the drive for dominance among global powers (Donnelly 2013: 276) . Thus, smaller countries are trying to position themselves through either 'distancing' or 'inclining' to the world's centres of power (The Editors, The Nation 2014). Such attempt are observed through declarations of some Western Balkan countries regarding the Ukrainian crisis in the context of the adaptation and harmonization of their foreign policy with the CFSP, which represents an obligation in the course of European integration (Rynning 2011: 23-42 ).
The Ukrainian crisis, which began in early 2014, caused predominantly by the neighbouring Russian Federation to prevent closer bonding of Ukraine with the European Union, contains certain characteristics identical to the Yugoslav crisis, i.e. primarily the Bosnian War (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) . Ukraine's territory is pray to Russian ambitions (the annexation of the Crimea in early March 2014) and plans of the pro-Russian separatists in the eastern parts of the country (the self-proclaimed People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk).
Although the Ukrainian Parliament passed a bill on the special status of these areas on 16 September 2014 (Minsk Protocol 2014 , it became clear that this would not satisfy the interests of the Russian separatists in these areas. At the same time, the European Parliament and the Ukrainian Rada adopted the Agreement on Ukraine's accession to the European Union (Blic 2014a) , which the Russian Federation clearly opposes and constantly demands its change (EU -Ukraine Association Agreement 2014).
The threat of further dissolution of Ukraine, which has been directly instigated by the neighbouring Russian Federation, remains. However, a certain disorientation of other actors is also evident -that of the United
States and the European Union to first prevent this conflict, and then to influence the reduction of open defiance of the neighbouring Russian Federation. Everything that the European Union has undertaken in relation to the crisis in Ukraine, by introducing several "rounds of sanctions" (Europa.
EU 2014a) against the Russian Federation, has been shown as insufficient for this country to completely abandon its hegemonic ambitions. Instead, Ukraine will remain a very unstable country that will not be able to realize its leading foreign policy goal -accession to the European Union. Other post-Soviet countries can face a situation similar to the Ukrainian one due to the growing ambitions of the Russian Federation (Blair 2014) .
As a result of growing tensions between the West and the East -the USA and the EU on the one hand, and the Russian Federation on the other, some Western Balkan countries reconsidered their previously established foreign policy course. This primarily applies to Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to a lesser extent to Macedonia. At the same time, in response to the Ukrainian crisis, Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo confirmed their pro-European foreign policy course. Supporting the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, they have shown that they would continue to be predictable and reliable partners. Both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia face problems of potential separatism, and therefore waver in relation to the direct support to the CFSP concerning the activities of the Russian Federation in Ukraine.
Leaders of the Republic Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina often point out the possibility of a referendum on the status of this entity, while recently in Macedonia, after more than two decades, the so-called Republic of Illirida was "proclaimed" in the territories predominantly populated by Albanians.
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At the same time, the Russian Federation, for the umpteenth time, noted that the expansion of NATO to the rest of the Western Balkans represents a provocation against this country.
2 In this context, it was pointed out to
Montenegro that, keeping in mind its aspirations to become a member of NATO, Russia would not look favourably at that, but would consider it a "provocation" (Kajošević 2014 with the exception of the Republic of Serbia (Đukanović 2010: 295-313 (Lopandić 2013: 7-20) .
In the meantime, the progress of other countries in the region also structures and institutions (Đukanović and Jovanović 2014: 59-80 Policy of the European Union after and during the process of negotiations (Simić 2013: 17-41 The case of the Republic of Croatia is similar. After leaving the Yugoslav Federation in 1991 it was faced with a search for its place in international relations and it began the process of European integration only at the end of the 1990s (Đukanović 2010: 295-313) . It should be stressed that in this process Croatia managed to establish a good basis for a "strategic partnership" with the United States, which ultimately resulted in its membership in the EU (2013) by the decision of its own political elite Serbia "tied itself" to the Russian Federation due to a number of unfavourable energy arrangements 
Quote -"Montenegro has a clear foreign policy orientation, which is in line with national interests and was repeatedly stated in talks with Russian officials and officials of other countries. Russia's position in relation to the expansion of the Alliance is also very well known. Montenegro will continue to build relationships and develop cooperation with Russia

Conclusion
It is obvious that all the dynamism, complexity and unpredictability of contemporary international relations and global politics is not possible to encompass in only one theoretical direction or its numerous internal varieties.
When it comes to the Ukrainian crisis, and the relationship between the Western Balkan countries towards the CFSP, it is obvious that the analysis requires taking into account the domination of both (neo)institutionalism and (neo)realism, as well as their internal synergy to the extent possible. Thus, research based on these two theoretical directions suggests the following conclusion/s. Still, it must be emphasized that the countries in the region, primarily in terms of energy and the supply of gas, are very much connected to the Russian Federation, and that the political influence of this country is being re-established in the region (Weber, Basseuner 2014) . This is especially evident in Serbia, as well as in the BiH entity -Republic of Srpska. The European Union, however, is trying to win over all the countries of the Western Balkans regarding support of sanctions already imposed in several rounds against the Russian Federation, due to the Ukrainian crisis.
In the next period, there will be many problems related to how the Western Balkan countries will accept any liability arising from the harmonization with the as well as other non-European centers of world politics, will not be sustainable in the long term for countries in the region, especially Serbia, which according to some announcements plans to fully harmonize its legislation with the European Union by 2019, as well as to fulfil the larger part of the obligations relating to the pre-accession period. Thus, the policy of the new "non-alignment" will not bring to its promoters the desired results on the foreign policy front. On the contrary, it can only further complicate the process of European integration and possibly tighten relations with Brussels.
It is clear that further harmonization of foreign policy with the EU's CFSP will not pose a problem for Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo, unless some drastic changes in the political relations and power occur, and/or right-wing political parties strengthen. On the contrary, it seems that Chapter 31 will be one of the easiest compared to e.g. Chapters 23 and 24 (Justice and Home Affairs), with which the negotiation process starts.
Certain reserves about the very dynamics of the negotiation process in
Montenegro, Serbia, and in perspective -Albania, should be preserved considering the announcements saying that in the next short-term period (5 years) there will be no new expansion, as well as that the negotiation process for most member states that joined after 2004 lasted several years (Maksimović 2014) . Nevertheless, this does not mean that the countries in the region should not continue to work on fundamental reforms and the harmonization of their political and economic system with the European Union.
It is important to add, in conclusion, that the countries of the Western
Balkans need to solve a number of bilateral problems. This will be one of the obligations in the process of joining the European Union and the one closely monitored. The dialogue started four years ago between the authorities in Belgrade and Pristina must continue and lead to a better mutual relationship. Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to lag in European integration and in the next period will continue to be burdened with solving domestic issues related to its own organization and economic consolidation. Thus, the sending of confusing and contradictory foreign policy signals from Sarajevo will continue in the future. When it comes to Macedonia, there will also be no substantial progress in Euro-Atlantic integration of the country, taking into account a nearly two and a half 
